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On Value-Attributions: 
Semantics and Beyond 
Isidora Stojanovic 
Institut Jean-Nicod – CNRS – ENS – EHESS
Abstract
This paper is driven by the idea that the contextualism-relativism debate regarding 
the semantics of value-attributions turns upon certain extra-semantic assumptions 
that are unwarranted. One is the assumption that the many-place predicate of truth, 
deployed by compositional semantics, cannot be directly appealed to in theorizing 
about people's assessments of truth value, but must be supplemented (if not replaced) 
by a different truth-predicate, obtained through certain "postsemantic" principles. 
Another is the assumption that semantics assigns to sentences not only truth values 
(as a function of various parameters, such as contexts, worlds and times), but also 
semantic contents, and that what context-sensitive expressions contribute to content 
are contextually determined elements. My first aim in this paper will be to show how 
the two assumptions have shaped two ways of understanding the debate between 
contextualism and relativism. My second aim will be to show that both assumptions 
belong outside semantics, and are moreover questionable.   
I Introduction: 
contextualism vs. relativism – a distinction without a difference?
In recent  years,  philosophy of  language and semantics have witnessed a vibrant 
Value-attributions 1 Isidora Stojanovic
debate between contextualist and relativist approaches to various areas of discourse; 
in particular, predicates of personal taste and, more generally, evaluative predicates 
and the languages of aesthetics and ethics. If the debate may appear to have reached 
an impasse, this may be because all the parties in the debate seem to presuppose 
certain principles regarding truth and content. The aim of my paper is to argue that 
the presupposed assumptions are unwarranted. There are two main assumptions, 
both of which may be traced back to David Kaplan's pioneering work on indexicals 
(1989). The first assumption concerns the definition of the truth predicate, and the 
second, the notion of semantic content. But before discussing those two assumptions,  
let me start from the question of  what demarcates relativist semantic frameworks 
from contextualist ones. As we shall see shortly, there does not seem to be a unique 
answer to this question. What I would like to do in this introductory section is look at 
one way of interpreting the relativists' insights, as put forward in the proposals of 
Kölbel (2002) and Lasersohn (2005), regarding the so-called predicates of personal 
taste, such as 'tasty' and 'delicious'. 
In those early relativist proposals,  it  has been held that predicates of personal 
taste require modifying our semantic framework and, in particular, introducing a 
novel parameter among the circumstances of evaluation, along with the parameters 
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of possible world and time. For our present purposes, we need not worry about the 
details of the arguments offered in those early proposals. Rather, let us look directly 
at the frameworks that were put forward as a result of those arguments. I will focus 
on  the  one  given  in  Lasersohn  (2005),  which  expands  upon  the  framework  of 
Kaplan  (1989),  the  main  novelty  being  that  circumstances  of  evaluation  are  no 
longer world-time pairs, but world-time-judge triples. 
Let us use double brackets to denote the semantic interpretation function and, for 
the sake of simplicity, let us put aside the parameter of a structure of interpretation 
(which specifies the universe, the sets of worlds and times and the relevant orderings 
among those, as well as the interpretation of the non-logical vocabulary). Then, if S 
is a sentence, c a context, w a world, t a time, j a "judge", and f an assignment of 
values to the variables, the basic format of semantic interpretation will look like this:
[[S]] (c, w, t, j, f) € {True, False} 
In other words, what this "says" is that the semantic interpretation of sentence S 
gives you a mapping from sequences of the form (c, w, t, j, f) to truth values, hence 
that sentence S receives a truth value only with respect to a context, a world, a time,  
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a judge, and an assignment of values to the variables.
A central tenet of those early relativist proposals was the idea that introducing a 
judge parameter was a mandatory move, and that no alternative semantics could 
account for the semantic behavior of predicates of personal taste. In particular, the 
more traditional approaches, which would handle the dependence of truth value on 
a judge (and his or her taste) by means of an implicit argument associated with the 
predicate, were discarded as inadequate and as incapable of providing an accurate 
semantic analysis.   
It is with that last claim that I took issue in my paper Talking about Taste (2007). 
There,  I  argued  that  from the  point  of  view of  semantics,  relativist  frameworks, 
understood as those that posit a judge parameter in the circumstances of evaluation, 
and contextualist frameworks, understood as those that treat predicates of personal 
taste (such as 'tasty') as involving an implicit argument for the "experiencer" or the 
person whose  taste  is  at  issue,  hence  analyzing what,  at  surface,  is  a  one-place 
predicate, 'tasty(x)', as, really, a two-place predicate, 'tasty-to (x,y)', were not much 
more than notational variants.  
My argument was based on a formal equivalence result, which it will be enough 
to summarize here. Let Sc and Sr be respectively sentences in the formal languages of 
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contexualist semantics (i.e. in which prima facie one-place predicates like 'tasty' are 
treated as two-place predicates, viz. 'tasty-to') and of relativist semantics (in which 
'tasty' remains a one-place predicate, but its interpretation is a function not only of a 
world and a time, but of a judge as well). The result proceeds by a definition of a bi-
directional translation procedure T between the two formal languages, for which the 
following holds. Let  f1, f2 be assignments of values to free variables, and let  w be a 
world of evaluation and u a judge. Then:
 
•  Sr is true with respect to f1, w and u iff T(Sr) is true with respect to f1
T and 
w, where assignment f1
T is defined in terms of f1 and u. 
•  Sc is true with respect to f2 and w iff T(Sc) is true with respect to f2, w and 
uT, where uT is a judge value obtained directly from f2.
In other words, given a natural language sentence, its contextualist counterpart is 
predicted to be true for the same distribution of values to the various parameters, as 
its relativist counterpart. I have furthermore interpreted this  equivalence result as 
suggesting that there is never going to be any properly semantic evidence to cut in 
favor of the one account over the other, given that no occurrence of a sentence 
containing a predicate of taste is going come out true in the one account and false in 
the other (provided, of course, that the value assigned to the implicit argument on a 
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contextualist analysis be the same as the value chosen for the judge parameter on a 
relativist analysis). 
My results were targeted at the idea that a contextualist account of the variability 
in truth value associated with a given expression relies on there being an implicit  
argument associated with the expression, whereas a relativist account relies on there 
being a corresponding parameter in the circumstances of evaluation, along with the 
world (and the time) of evaluation. That this is at least one possible way of drawing a 
line of division between the more traditional contextualist frameworks and the more 
avant-garde  relativist  frameworks  may  be  seen  from this  passage  from Kölbel's 
Introduction to the volume Relative Truth:     
"The  focus  of  this  book  is  whether  there  are  novel  truth-
determining  factors,  such  as  standards  of  taste  and  states  of 
knowledge, and how exactly such a determination relation should 
be construed. The two basic rival options are as follows. First, the 
view  that  the  sentences  in  question  merely  exhibit  a  hitherto 
unnoticed  contextual  dependence  analogous  to  indexicality  (…) 
Secondly  the  view  that  the  sentences  in  question  express  non-
standard propositions that exhibit a relativity of truth analogous to 
that postulated, for example, by temporalists (…).  I shall call views 
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of the second kind "relativist". Relativism is therefore the view that 
some propositions vary in their truth-value with some parameter(s) 
over and above the possible world parameter." (2008: 4)
However, with the benefit of hindsight, it seems more and more clear that this is 
not the only possible line of division. In the following three sections, I shall discuss 
another line of division, the one favored by such relativists as John MacFarlane. In 
the section V, I will address more specifically Lasersohn's reply to my equivalence 
results, and thereby consider yet another possible line of division.
II Assessment-sensitivity: from future contingents to value-attributions
While  the  distinction  discussed  in  the  previous  section  remains  relevant  to  the 
question of how to best account for variability in truth value, the idea that that is the 
contextualism-relativism distinction has been challenged. John MacFarlane (2009) 
holds that merely introducing some novel parameter among the circumstances of 
evaluation does not suffice to make a framework "relativist"  (with respect to that 
parameter). In this section, I would like to go back to the source of MacFarlane's 
reluctance to view circumstance-dependence as a hallmark of relativism. It should 
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be noted that MacFarlane's original motivations for relativism were rooted in the 
problem of  future  contingency.  Understanding MacFarlane's  move in the case  of 
future contingents will help us understand his motivations for introducing contexts 
of assessments, which are crucial to his account of value-attributions, too. 
Consider a standard temporalist semantic framework, in which the truth value of 
a sentence is evaluated at a context, a world, and a time of evaluation, and where the 
usual temporal operators, such as "it was the case" or "it will be the case", are treated 
as sentential operators whose semantic clauses "shift" the time of evaluation. Thus 
e.g. 'Past S' is true at (c, w, t) iff there is some time t' earlier than t such that 'S' is true  
at (c, w, t'), where c is a context, w a world of evaluation, and t and t' are times. 
Now, consider some future contingent statement, such as "There will be life on 
Mars". Assuming that the current state of universe leaves it open whether there will  
ever be life on Mars, the statement, as of now, is neither true nor false. But suppose 
that in ten million years, there gets to be life on Mars; then, once life on Mars has 
been brought about,  the very same statement, evaluated retrospectively from that 
future standpoint, arguably ought to come out true. 
These seem to be the two desiderata for views that endorse relativism about time-
dependence and that allow for a statement that is neither true nor false to become 
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true in the future. However, a standard temporalist framework does not appear to be 
"relativist enough" to give satisfaction to both desiderata. It can either account for the 
idea that the statement lacks a truth value (e.g. taking a branching-time perspective 
and holding that a statement that gets realized on some branches but not on others is 
neither true nor false), or else, for the idea that the statement is true (e.g. taking a 
branching-time perspective but holding that among all the branches, there is some 
privileged one that corresponds to the actual future, the so-called Thin Red Line). 
Standard temporalist frameworks do not thus seem to be able, as such, to account for 
the idea that the statement under consideration is devoid of truth value as of now, 
but true as of the time that lies 10 million years ahead. In particular, the parameter 
of time of evaluation does not seem to be able to play the role that one might have 
thought it could play. For, let t0 stand for the present time (i.e. year 2012) and let t10M 
stand for some time that lies 10 million years ahead. One might have thought that 
the statement "There will be life on Mars", as evaluated at t0, is neither true nor false, 
but as evaluated at t10M (after there has been life on Mars), true. But that won't work, 
because the future tense operator, on the analysis that has precisely motivated the 
temporalist treatment, shifts the time of evaluation: evaluated at t10M, the statement is 
true iff "There is life on Mars" is true at some time that lies in the future of t10M. Yet, it 
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may well be the case that by then, there will have been life on Mars, but there no 
longer is nor will ever again be, thereby making the statement false when evaluated 
at t10M, contrary to the initial desiderata.  
MacFarlane's move in the case of future contingents was to introduce, along with 
the "old" context-parameter, a new context-parameter, calling the former "a context 
of utterance" and the latter, "a context of assessment". It is the former's job to specify 
the time that serves as a starting point for the future tense operator, and the latter's,  
to specify the time at which the statement is assessed for its truth value. Hence if a  
context of assessment takes place ten million years from now (i.e. at t10M), and there 
has been life on Mars in the meantime, then those "branches" at which there has 
never been nor will ever be life on Mars are no longer live possibilities, turning the 
statement from truth-valueless to true.1   
We need not worry about the details of MacFarlane's proposal concerning future 
contingents, which raise issues of their own. What matters to the present discussion 
is that MacFarlane saw this proposal as applicable to value-attributions and other 
phenomena of the same ilk. MacFarlane's account of predicates of personal taste and, 
1 This is a simplified presentation of the proposal in MacFarlane (2003). Note that in MacFarlane 
(2012), he has abandoned his earlier view and has opted for a non-temporalist framework, in 
which tenses get treated as quantifiers over times. 
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more generally, of value-judgments, endorses the sort of relativism that we saw in 
the introductory section, but then takes it one step further, by introducing contexts  
of assessment. My aim in the next section will be to see how this more elaborate  
version of relativism contextualism improves (if it does) upon contextualism. 
III A second stab at the contextualism-relativism divide:
adicity-diminishing definitions of the truth predicate 
Consider a framework for the semantics of predicates of taste that is just like the 
framework that, in sect. I, we called "relativist". The assignment of interpretations, 
and in particular, of truth values to sentences, will be done, as usual, with respect to 
a structure of interpretation (which, for simplicity, we shall again set aside), and an 
assignment of values to the free variables f, as well as with respect to a context c and 
to circumstances of evaluation, whose parameters include a world w, a time t,  a 
judge j.2 Thus the interpretation of any given predicate P will be not only a function 
of a world and a time, but of a judge as well – though, of course, there are many 
2 MacFarlane (2012) uses a "gustatory standards" parameter, rather than of a judge parameter. 
However, the exact choice of the nature of the parameter used – be it individuals, groups, judges 
(qua individuals endowed with a certain taste), gustatory standards, or directly tastes, turns out to 
be orthogonal to the issue that occupies us here.
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predicates whose interpretation will remain constant in the judge parameter. 
The important point is that the predicate of truth that we end up with is not a 
monadic but, rather, a many-place predicate. Things are not true simpliciter. Rather, 
sentences are true with respect to a context, a world, a time, a judge, an assignment 
of values to the variables, and so on. Thus, once again, the basic format of semantic  
interpretation will be as follows:
[[S]] (c, w, t, j, f) € {True, False} 
 This basic format of truth-parametrization will be shared by the "contextualist" 
as well as the "relativist" approaches, as they are about to be defined. However, as we 
are going to see, the difference between the two approaches (or families thereof) will 
not show up in semantics, i.e. the machinery that maps, in a compositional manner,  
the sentences of a language to truth values (as a function of appropriate parameters). 
Rather, it will show up in what MacFarlane (2003, 2012) calls "postsemantics". 
Before we pin down the distinction that, in MacFarlane's view, is the one that 
distinguishes contextualism from relativism, let  us observe that there are various 
ways in which, qua theorists, we may toy with the notion of truth that transpires out 
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of the basic semantic format.  For instance, instead of taking the truth value of a 
sentence to depend on all those parameters that I have listed above, we could (setting 
once again the structure of interpretation aside) say that it  only depends on two 
parameters: a context and a circumstance of evaluation. But then, what we would do 
is construe circumstances as sequences consisting of a world, a time, a judge, and an 
assignment of values to the variables. Or we could go even further and say that the 
truth value of a sentence depends on a single parameter, a "point of evaluation", but 
then  construe  such  "points"  as  sequences  consisting  of  a  context  plus  all  the 
parameters  that  had  been  previously  subsumed  under  a  "circumstance  of 
evaluation".  
Another option would be to say that truth values are not assigned to sentences but 
to sentence-context pairs, and analogously, that semantic interpretation applies not 
to sentences but to sentences-in-context:  
[[(S, c)]] (w, t, j, f) € {True, False}.   
 Last but not least (and this will bring us back to our main issue) we may attempt 
a non-trivial principle that would relate the many-place predicate of truth to a two-
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place predicate, one that applies to sentences relative to contexts, thus eliminating 
dependence on the circumstances of evaluation. This "adicity-diminishing" definition 
of truth may be obtained from the basic semantic format as follows: 
[[S]] (c) = True* iffdef for all assignments f, [[S]] (c, w
c, tc, jc, f) = True,
where S is a sentence, c a context, and where wc, tc and jc are respectively the 
world, the time and the judge of the context c (or somehow directly supplied by c). 
This corresponds to the definition that David Kaplan provides for sentence-truth-
in-context.3 I will speak of principles such as this one as "adicity-diminishing", since 
their main purpose it to reduce the adicity (i.e. the number of argument-slots) of the 
truth predicate, from many-place to two-place, applying to sentences and contexts.4 
It is this principle that MacFarlane seems to see as a trademark of contextualism. 
In MacFarlane's terminology, an "indexical-contextualist" approach to a given class 
3 I shall be using "True*" to denote the predicate of truth derived from the semantic predicate of 
truth. As for the principle, see Kaplan (1989): 547; of course, he does not have a judge parameter 
in his semantics. In Predelli and Stojanovic (2008), we called the principle "the Classic Reduction". 
4 The same sort of principle is sometimes referred to as "diagonalization", echoing a similar move in 
the work of Stalnaker (1998). Note that, ultimately, one might aim at supplementing this principle 
with yet another adicity-diminishing principle, in order to reduce "True" to a monadic predicate, 
applying (arguably) to utterances. Kaplan does that by speaking of "sentence-occurrences" being 
true, where a sentence occurrence is basically identified with a sentence-context pair. 
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of evaluative expressions treats them as indexicals in disguise (or as containing a 
"hidden indexical"), while a "nonindexical-contextualist" approach posits a suitable 
parameter in the circumstances of evaluation, but crucially, both types of approach 
would endorse the appropriate adicity-diminishing principle (for each and every 
parameter in the circumstances of evaluation). By contrast, MacFarlane's view still 
endorses that very same principle for the world parameter, as well as for the time 
parameter,5 but, crucially, not for the judge parameter. Instead, MacFarlane's formal 
machinery is going to deploy the context of assessment-parameter. This parameter is 
only put at work when it comes to defining sentence truth. Sharing the spirit of the 
previous adicity-diminishing principle, MacFarlane offers the following one: 
[[S]] (cU, cA) = True iff for all assignments f, 
[[S]] (cU,, w
cu, tcu, jca, f) = True,
where wcU and tcU are the world and the time of cU (the context of utterance), but 
jcA is the judge of cA (the context of assessment).
6 This, too, is an adicity-diminishing 
5 As noted, MacFarlane moves back and forth between a temporalist and an eternalist treatment of 
time. In (2012): Ch. VII, where he discusses matters of taste, he is using a time parameter. 
6 Here is MacFarlane's definition: "A sentence S is true as used at context cU and assessed from a 
context cA iff for all assignments, [[S]]
c
U
 
(wcU, ,tcU, gcA) = True, where wcU, is the world of cU, tcU is 
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principle.  The  difference,  however,  is  that  before  one  can  proceed  to  eliminate 
certain argument-places in the basic semantic format for the truth predicate, one 
first  needs  to  introduce  a  context  of  assessment.  Once  this  new  parameter  is 
available, one can deploy it in one's adicity-diminishing principle, thus eliminating 
any further dependence on the judge parameter (as well as on any other parameters 
that similarly track assessment-sensitivity).
IV The many-place predicate of truth, and the bridging principles
The contextualism-relativism distinction that we are now considering operates, then, 
at  a  "postsemantic"  level,  to  use  MacFarlane's  terminology.  The newly introduced 
parameter of a context of assessment remains idle in the semantic machinery, as it 
does not appear (or, at least, does not play any role) in any of the semantic clauses of 
any expression (or, for that matter, any other linguistic constructions). Ipso facto, it 
stays out of the entire process of compositional computation of truth conditions, and 
only shows up at the point at which one inquires about the sentence's truth value. 
Now, MacFarlane's own tacit acknowledgment that the relativist "semantics" that 
the time of cU, and gcA is the gustatory standard (“taste”) of the agent of cA (that is, the assessor’s 
taste at the time of cA) (MacFarlane 2012: 175). 
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he is offering may be distinguished from contextualist semantics only at the level of 
postsemantics, already grants my repeatedly made point that from the viewpoint of 
semantics, contextualism and relativism are not much more than notational variants. 
However, one might object that merely calling some principle "postsemantic" does 
not render it irrelevant to properly semantic considerations. So let me devote this 
section to the question of it may seem desirable to posit such adicity-diminishing 
postsemantic principles.  The following observation by Max Kölbel  reaches to the 
heart of the matter:  
It will turn out that semantic theories for natural languages define 
a  three-place  truth-predicate  applicable  to  sentences,  and  that 
some extra-semantic principles are needed in order to relate this 
semantic truth-predicate to truth in any pre-theoretic sense. 
(2008: 5)
As we have seen, the semantic truth-predicate is not just a three-place predicate, 
but, on most construals, a many-place predicate. Be that as it may, the important 
point is that something needs to be said regarding the question of how the truth-
predicate deployed in semantics relates to the notion of truth that, rather than being 
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a technical tool of a theory, is what the theory aims (inter alia) to account for. Let us 
call principles that, in general, articulate the relationship between those different 
notions of truth, "bridging principles". What those principles are, and whether they 
can be stated in a way that is not going to be question-begging, is an important and 
difficult  question. The quest for such principles is what,  I  think,  underscores the 
motivations for adicity-diminishing principles, be they contextualist or relativist.   
 While it is beyond controversy that something, at some point, needs to be said on 
how semantic truth relates to truth tout court, so to speak, I would like to make two 
points. The first is that, however such bridging principles might go, they are going to 
be  extra-semantic  principles.  This  reinforces  my  claim  that  the  contextualism-
relativism debate does not bear on semantics proper, but rather, falls somewhere 
beyond. My second point, albeit somewhat underdeveloped at this stage, is that the 
adicity-diminishing principles, relativist as well  as contextualist,  are questionable, 
and had better be dispensed with. Of course, to fully vindicate this point, I should 
have been able to provide an answer to the question of how semantic truth relates to 
other notions of truth – a question that I couldn't possibly hope to answer within the 
span of this paper. Instead, what I shall do is how that there are reasons to doubt the 
well-foundedness  of  such  extra-semantic  principles,  Kaplan's  and  MacFarlane's 
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alike.
First things first,  let me start with Kaplan's motivations. Kaplan's idea that the 
correct notion of sentence-truth-in-context is that of the sentence being true with 
respect to the context at stake  and at the circumstances  determined by that very  
context  is one of those ideas that have been taken on board by Kaplan's followers 
without  being questioned  at  all.  However,  once  we  look  at  this  idea  with  some 
scrutiny, it becomes unclear what solid motivations could support it. Places at which 
Kaplan discusses the idea are scarce; here is one:     
Since  the  content  of  an  occurrence  of  a  sentence  containing 
indexicals  depends  on  the  context,  the  notion  of  truth  must  be 
relativized to a context. If c is a context, then an occurrence of φ in 
c is true iff the content expressed by φ in this context is true when 
evaluated with respect to the circumstances of the context. (…) If 
you try out the notion of truth on a few examples, you will see that 
it is correct. If I now utter a sentence, I will have uttered a truth just 
in  case  what  I  said,  the  content,  is  true  in  these  circumstances. 
(Kaplan 1989: 522-3)
The motivations that Kaplan offers here are shaky. The suggestion that we "try out 
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the notion of truth on a few examples" shows that the endorsement of the related 
adicity-diminishing principle relies heavily on intuitions. What is more, Kaplan is 
appealing to the notions of 'what is said' and of 'content' that, as we shall see soon, 
are equally shaky and intuition-driven. 
All in all, Kaplan's adicity-diminishing principle, which reduces the many-place 
predicate of sentence truth (true with respect to a context, a world, a time, etc.) to 
the two-place predicate (true with respect to a context) has been introduced into the 
formal framework, and has become part of the Kaplanian heritage, without any solid 
arguments or evidence that would show it to be a correct principle.7 
To drive the point home, let me now state the theoretical options that appear to 
be available to us. All of the options will share the same underlying semantic notion 
of truth, but will differ as to the question of how that notion relates to various other  
7 The notion of truth obtained through the adicity-diminishing principle has also been used in the 
definition of logical notions, such as that of validity. In Kaplan's formal logic of indexicals, sentence 
S is valid iff for all structures and assignments, and for every context c, S is true in c (i.e. true when 
evaluated with respect to c, wc and tc). A motivation for (and, at the same time, a consequence of) 
this definition was that the truth expressed by an utterance of the sentence "I am here now" would 
come out as a truth of logic. Kaplan considered the sentence at stake as "deeply, and somehow 
universally true" (1989: 509) and held that "one need only understand [its] meaning to know that 
it cannot be uttered falsely" (ibid.). The example of "I am here now" has generated a considerable 
literature, although most of it has focused on the question whether that particular case is or isn't a 
truth of logic, without reaching all the way down to the source of the problem. My own take on 
the question has been to argue that the very notion of validity, rooted in the adicity-diminishing 
definition of sentence truth, is what we ought to revise (cf. Stojanovic 2012). 
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notions of truth, including the intuitive notion of truth. The first two options, already 
discussed, share the idea that there must be some non-trivial adicity-diminishing 
principle in order to bridge the gap between semantics and the rest, but diverge on 
the question of  what that  principle should be.  Insofar  as judge-dependence,  and 
value-attributions more generally, are concerned, we have the following divide:  
(CPS) "Contextualist" postsemantics:
[[S]] (c) = True* iff for all assignments f, [[S]] (c, wc, tc, jc, f) = True;
(RPS) "Relativist" postsemantics:
[[S]] (cU, cA) = True* iff for all assignments f, [[S]] (cU,, w
cu, tcu, jca, f) = True.
But there is yet another option, which is the one that I favor. The option at stake 
will  simply abstain from positing any adicity-diminishing principle at  all.  To see 
better what such an option would amount to, let us consider a concrete case of a 
value-attribution. Imagine that, in reference to a certain song, a person – call her 
Alma – says "This is a great song!", and that, in accordance to her standards, Alma 
values the the song at stake as great indeed. What will be the truth value of Alma's  
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utterance? Contextualism answers,  "true".  Relativism answers,  "true if  the song at 
stake falls out as a great song on the assessor’s standards, false otherwise". Thus if 
another person – call him Bruce – is assessing Alma's utterance for a truth value, and 
Bruce doesn't value the song at stake as great at all, then the utterance is false. 
Now, the approach that I favor will answer that there is no principled, context-
independent way of answering the question in advance. Let Bruce be the person who 
is assessing Alma's utterance for a truth value. Nevertheless, depending on various 
pragmatics factors that may come into play in the context in which this assessment is 
taking place, it may be that the standards with respect to which the song's greatness 
is to be evaluated are Alma's standards, or it may be that they are Bruce's standards, 
or that they are some standards generally accepted in a given community, or some 
standards prescribed by some salient authority, and so on. The gist of the approach 
that I favor is to hold that the choice of a specific set of standards, or more generally, 
the choice of values of the parameters of evaluation at which a given sentence, as 
used in a given context, is to be evaluated for a truth value, is not driven by any rigid 
extra-semantic principles, such as CPS or RPS; rather, it is pragmatically driven. Let 
me thus call this type of approach, "pragmatic". Pragmatic approaches, in sum, will 
rely on the very same compositional semantics as contextualism and relativism (as 
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currently  construed);  however,  unlike  these,  they  will  not  postulate  any  adicity-
diminishing postsemantic principles. They will only rely on a single truth predicate, 
the many place predicate of truth that one can read off from the basic semantic  
format. When it comes to the question of how the notion of truth deployed in the 
semantics relates to other notions of truth, such as the intuitive notion of truth that 
underlies our talk about truth (as when we ask whether a given utterance is true, or  
whether someone was speaking truth on a given occasion), pragmatic approaches, as 
their name suggest, will relay the question to pragmatics.   
Let  me  end  this  section  by  comparing  the  three  approaches  –  contextualist, 
relativist, and pragmatic – with respect to the range of predictions that they make, 
or, as the case may be, allow for. It takes little to see that the three approaches may 
be inter-ranked in terms of their flexibility regarding predictions of truth value. RPS 
is more flexible than CPS, since it allows as a special case that cA (i.e. the context of 
assessment) be identical to cU (i.e. the context of utterance). In other words, every 
prediction of a truth value (for a given sentence, as used in a given context) that can 
be generated within CPS, can also be generated within RPS, but not vice versa. 
The pragmatic approach, in turn, is at least as flexible as RPS (and, by transitivity, 
more than CPS), given that every sequence of the relevant evaluation parameters, i.e. 
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every (world, time, judge)-sequence, that may be supplied by cU and cA jointly,
8 may 
be obviously directly supplied as such. Conversely, it may be argued that  in most  
cases  RPS is less flexible than the pragmatic approach; however, the details of that 
argument will depend on the specific case under consideration. Thus, if we are only 
considering judgments of taste, in isolation from other value-attributions and other 
"assessment-sensitive" expressions (e.g. knowledge attributions or epistemic modals), 
the context of assessment's only purpose is to supply a value for the judge parameter, 
and RPS will  not be more restrictive than the pragmatic approach. On the other 
hand,  consider  a  natural  extension of  the  relativist  framework to  other  types  of 
assessment-sensitivity, resulting in a series of other parameters in the circumstances 
of evaluation, s1, s2 … sn. We will then get:
(ERPS) Extended relativist postsemantics:
[[S]] (cU, cA) = True* iff for all assignments f, 
[[S]] (cU,, w
cu, tcu, jca, s1
ca, s2
ca … sn
ca,, f) = True. 
Whether (ERPS) is more restrictive than the pragmatic approach will crucially 
8 Remember that the world and the time being are supplied by cU, and the judge, by cA.
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depend on how exactly the contexts of assessments are understood and modeled. If  
for every possible combination of values for the parameters that get determined by 
the context of assessment, there is a corresponding "context of assessment", then it  
will have the required flexibility to cover the range of predictions that the pragmatic 
approach allows for; otherwise it won't.
V It's all about Content
So far, we have seen two ways of describing the contextualism-relativism divide. The 
first one was concerned with the semantic (and, to some extent, syntactic) analysis of 
the variability in truth value that judgments of taste and attributions of value exhibit; 
the second one was concerned with "postsemantics" and the definition(s) of the truth 
predicate(s). I have argued that in both cases, the divide has been overestimated, and 
that relativism, whether semantic or postsemantic, is not extraordinarily innovative. 
In the previous section, we also saw that Kaplan's followers took on as part of the 
whole  "package  deal"  certain  assumptions,  like  the  adicity-diminishing  principle 
concerning the truth predicate; assumptions that, as I argued, are unwarranted and 
poorly motivated.9 Another such unwarranted piece of the Kaplanian heritage is the 
9 The metaphor of a package deal comes from Lewis (1980), who famously wrote: "I see Stalnaker 
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notion of content, which Kaplan further identified with what is said. Here is a typical 
passage:
 
The content of an expression is always taken with respect to a given 
context of use. Thus when I say "I was insulted yesterday" a specific 
content –  what is said – is expressed. Your utterance of the same 
sentence,  or  mine  on  another  day,  would  not  express  the  same 
content. (Kaplan 1979: 83)
Even though the notion of content, and specifically the equation "content = what  
is said", were not met with unanimous approval (even among Kaplan's followers), it 
is surprising to see what a central place considerations about what is said occupy in  
the  ongoing contextualism-relativism debate.  One  frequently  finds  contextualism 
described (by relativists) as a certain view regarding an expression's contribution to 
'what is said', as may be seen from these the following passages:     
and Kaplan as putting forth package deals" (p. 42). Lewis further writes: "Part of each package is a 
preference, which I oppose as unwarranted and arbitrary, for variable but simple semantic values" 
(ibid.), where by the latter he means contextually determined semantic contents. In this respect, 
some of the points that I am about to make, to the effect that the Kaplanian notion of content is 
unwarranted, was already there in Lewis' discussion, to which I owe a lot. 
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"The contextualist takes the subjectivity of a discourse to consist in 
the  fact  that  it  is  covertly  about  the  speaker  (or  a  larger  group 
picked out by the speaker's context and intentions). Thus, in saying 
that apples are "delicious",  the speaker says, in effect,  that apples 
taste good to her (or to those in her group)." (MacFarlane 2007) 
"On this view, 'It's wrong to cheat' involves ellipsis, or a place holder 
indicating a set of standards, a code, whatever. What [its] use says 
depends on what has been elided or what is being assigned to the 
place holder." (Richard 2008)
Both MacFarlane and Richard, in describing the rival contextualist views, place a 
lot of weight on the idea that contextualism is a view about what the speaker says. 
In fairness to MacFarlane and Richard, it may be acknowledged that  in certain  
debates, "contextualist" views are views about what is said.10 Nevertheless, it is also 
true that, in arguing against contextualism, some of the relativists' arguments seem 
to rest on equivocation. For, relativism has been put forward as an alternative to the 
more traditional semantic frameworks, and the latter were argued to be incapable of 
10 That would be, for instance, if not the most accurate then at least not an inaccurate description of 
contextualism in the sense of Recanati (2004). As for the different meanings that the term 
'contextualism' receives in the different debates, see the discussion in Stojanovic (2008b). 
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allowing for a correct treatment of predicates of taste, value-attributions, and so on. 
But contextualism, if understood as a view about the structure and the properties of 
a given semantic framework, is obviously not a view about 'what is said'. The formal 
framework of Kaplan (1989), as such, is one in which, to be sure, one can define a 
notion of 'content' (or 'what is said') the way Kaplan does, but not one of which such 
a notion is constitutive. The notion of content comes over and above the semantic 
framework itself. It is therefore perfectly consistent to endorse "contextualist" formal 
semantics, such as that in Kaplan (1989) or, for that matter, any double-indexed 
semantics,  without  being  "contextualist"  in  the  sense  of  taking  the  contextually 
supplied elements to contribute to what is said.11 
A similar misconception concerns the notion of 'content' (even when the latter is 
not identified with 'what is said').  Thus,  for instance,  in reply to the equivalence 
results from (Stojanovic 2007), rehearsed here in section I, Lasersohn wrote:
But  really,  this  proof  establishes  intertranslatability  only  in  a 
relatively  broad  sense.  This  becomes  apparent  as  soon  as  one 
notices  that  Stojanovic  nowhere  gives  an  explicit  definition  of 
11 Ninan (2010) forcefully makes a related point, by showing that the notion of content that may be 
put to use in providing a compositional semantics for intensional operators cannot be identified 
with the notion of content that may be put to use in an account of assertion. 
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semantic  content,  or  an  explanation  of  how  content  relates  to 
context.  If,  following  Kaplan,  we  assume  that  the  values  of 
pronouns  are  fixed  as  part  of  the  assignment  of  contents  to 
expressions in context […] the translation function will not respect 
sameness and difference of semantic content. […] Showing that two 
sentences have the same distribution of truth values across a set of 
models or indices does not show that they are equivalent in content, 
if the mapping from indices to truth values proceeds Kaplan-style 
in two steps,  and content  is  defined  with reference  to  the  level. 
between  the  steps.  Since  the  debate  between  relativism  and 
contextualism turns partly on the  issue of  which parameters get 
fixed in which step, we cannot ignore this issue in comparing the 
two approaches. I conclude that the use of non-standard indices is 
not  semantically  equivalent  to  the  use  of  implicit  pronoun 
arguments without such indices. (2008: 319-20)
If the Kaplanian notion of content should turn out to be a semantic notion, and if 
the debate between relativism and contextualism should indeed (even if only partly)  
be a debate about what goes into the content and what doesn't,  then Lasersohn's 
conclusion would be justified. However, the antecedents in both conditionals heavily 
rely  on a  notion that  is  far  from being uncontroversial.  Or,  to  be  more precise, 
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insofar as the notion of content is a technical notion, defining 'contents' as mappings 
from circumstances of evaluation (or 'indices') to truth values, the notion  is clear 
enough. But then, in order for the debate to make sense, we would need to be able to 
compare and evaluate the different approaches by relating the technical notion of 
'content' to some empirically testable predictions. Yet that final, crucial step remains 
as unclear as ever.
VI Conclusion:
contextualism vs. relativism – a barren debate?
The  overall  discussion  in  this  paper  has  been  more  critical  than  constructive.  I 
started  by  rehearsing the  results  that  show the  contextualist  "implicit  argument" 
approaches to be equivalent (when suitably construed) to the "relativist" approaches 
à la  Lasersohn and Kölbel, which posit a novel parameter in the circumstances of 
evaluation in order to handle variations in truth value associated with predicates of 
personal taste and, more generally, with value-attributions. However, we have seen 
that the situation is more complicated, to the extent that there is no consensus as to 
what the divide between contextualism and relativism precisely amounts to. That has 
led me to look at another construal of the divide, the one that has emerged from the 
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work of John MacFarlane. On that construal, the relevant question is that of deciding 
how to fix the values of the appropriate parameters to which truth – or, at least, the 
notion  of  truth  with  which  semantics  operates  –  is  relative.  On  that  construal, 
contextualism is the  view that  the context  of  utterance fixex those values,  while 
relativism holds that the context of assessment does that job. My own take on this 
choice has been to reject the very idea that we ought to choose. I have argued that 
both options rest on extra-semantic principles for which not enough motivation has 
been provided. 
To be sure, the observation, made by Kölbel and others, that there had better be  
some way of relating the semantic many-place predicate of truth to the notion(s) of 
truth that are relevant to other philosophical enterprises, such as giving an account 
of assertion, knowledge, and the like, remains a valid observation. Nevertheless, my 
point  is  that  the  adicity-diminishing  principles  proposed  by  contextualists  and 
relativists alike are not sufficient to bridge the gap. First, we could see that Kaplan's  
motivations for the principle boiled down to the idea that if we "try out the notion of 
truth on a few examples, [we'd] see that it is correct". But precisely, judgments of 
taste, value-attributions, and other phenomena of their ilk, shed serious doubt on the 
correctness of the principle. Second, although MacFarlane's amendment may present 
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some improvement  over  the old principle,  it,  too,  falls  short  of  bridging the  gap 
between semantics and the other areas mentioned (assertion, belief, knowledge, etc.); 
witness the fact that when it comes to applying the resulting notion of relative truth 
to those other areas, one can see MacFarlane go through immense struggle to bridge 
the remaining gap (cf. e.g. MacFarlane (2005) and (2012, Ch. 5)). 
My own suggestion, albeit programmatic, is that it might be best not to stipulate 
any adicity-diminishing principles at all. Of course, if such a view is to be seen as a 
rival to the views that endorse some adicity-diminishing principle or other, be it 
contextualist or relativist, I would need to flesh out in greater detail how semantics  
would connect with an account of assertion, belief, etc., without transiting through 
"postsemantics".  Let  me leave that as a prospect for future research. For the time 
being, I hope to have achieved the more modest goal of showing that our semantic 
machinery, and the corresponding notion of truth, do not by themselves require that 
there be  any further adicity-diminishing principles.  Hence,  if  the contextualism-
relativism divide is shaped upon the choice between Kaplanian vs.  MacFarlanian 
postsemantics, then it may well turn out to be a barren debate, should it turn out  
that, as I contend, no specific adicity-diminishing principles are required.  
Finally, in the last section, I have considered the contextualism-relativism divide 
Value-attributions 32 Isidora Stojanovic
as shaped upon the choice of what one puts into what is said, and/or into semantic 
content, and what one decides to leave out. Once again, if my proposal is to be taken 
as a competitor, I would need to say more on how semantics connects with assertion 
and other areas in which the notion of content has been put to use. Note, though, 
that in this respect, none among the existing relativist proposals, to my knowledge, 
has attempted to provide a full-fledged account of 'what is said'. Conversely, I have 
made attempts elsewhere to spell out the main tenets of an alternative account of 
semantic content, which rejects the Kaplanian assumption that indexicals (and, for 
that matter, other context-sensitive expressions) contribute contextually determined 
elements to content/what is said (Stojanovic (2008a), (2009)). For present purposes, 
the important point, already anticipated in Lewis (1980), is that such assumptions 
about content and 'what is said' do not come from the semantics itself, but must be 
superposed over it. Hence, once again, if contextualism is to be distinguished from 
relativism in terms of such extra-semantic assumptions, it may well turn out to be a 
barren debate, given that the underlying assumptions about what is said and content 
that are presupposed in the debate are already highly questionable. 
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